On October 15, the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) National Fraud Enforcement Division (the Fraud Division) and the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (HHS-OIG), announced a joint policy (the Policy) coordinating voluntary self-disclosures in criminal health care fraud matters. Under the Policy, a company will, in a single qualifying voluntary self-disclosure to the Fraud Division’s Health Care Fraud Section, receive the benefits of both DOJ’s Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (CEP) and HHS-OIG’s Health Care Fraud Self-Disclosure Protocol (SDP).

At the same time, HHS-OIG updated the SDP to clarify that criminal health care matters should be disclosed to DOJ, not HHS-OIG. A company that discloses only to HHS-OIG generally will not be credited with having made a voluntary self-disclosure to DOJ and will not qualify for a CEP declination on that basis.

The Policy answers a question that has long complicated self-disclosure decisions in the health care industry: not just whether to disclose, but where. This alert summarizes the Policy, its limits, and the practical implications for health care and life sciences companies.

Background: Overlapping Exposure, Multiple Points of Entry

As the Policy recognizes, a single course of conduct in the health care space (for example, “an illegal remuneration arrangement, a scheme to bill for medically unnecessary services, or a scheme involving an excluded person”) frequently gives rise to overlapping criminal, civil, and administrative matters involving both the Health Care Fraud Section and HHS-OIG. Companies facing that overlap previously had to decide which agency to approach first, and risked forfeiting benefits under one program by disclosing to the other.

The two programs offer different benefits. Under the CEP, which DOJ released in March 2026 and Lowenstein Sandler detailed in a prior alert, a company that voluntarily self-discloses, fully cooperates, and timely and appropriately remediates will receive a declination absent aggravating circumstances. The SDP, by contrast, resolves liability under HHS-OIG’s civil monetary penalty authorities, offering a speedy resolution, a lower multiplier (that is, the factor by which the single damages amount, such as the improper payment received, is multiplied to calculate the settlement amount), and an exclusion release without an integrity agreement obligation.

Assistant Attorney General Colin M. McDonald framed the Policy as eliminating “unnecessary bureaucratic barriers,” stating that “[t]here is now one clear point of contact: DOJ’s Fraud Division” and warning that “[i]f a company conceals what it knows, it should expect a very different conversation.”

The Policy

The Policy establishes two core rules.

One Disclosure, Coordinated Benefits

A company making a voluntary self-disclosure to the Health Care Fraud Section, within the meaning of DOJ’s CEP, related to conduct involving a federal health care program (as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(f)) “shall receive the benefits” of the HHS-OIG SDP. Key mechanics include:

  • No duplicate submission through the HHS-OIG SDP web portal is required.
  • Promptly upon receipt, the Health Care Fraud Section will provide HHS-OIG with a copy of the disclosure.
  • The Policy applies to voluntary self-disclosures of potential criminal violations affecting one or more federal health care programs made to the Fraud Division on or after the Policy’s October 15 effective date.
  • Disclosures may be reported to the Fraud Division at corporate.enforcement@usdoj.gov.

HHS-OIG-Only Disclosures Generally Will Not Qualify

A disclosure made only to HHS-OIG under its SDP generally will not qualify as a voluntary self-disclosure to the Fraud Division and therefore generally will not satisfy the criteria for a declination under DOJ’s CEP. HHS-OIG updated the SDP to clarify that it is not available for criminal law violations. A disclosure to either agency may nonetheless be considered as part of a company’s cooperation and remediation, and the Policy does not limit credit otherwise available under DOJ’s CEP, the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Justice Manual § 9-28.000), or the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.

The Policy’s Limits

  • Every DOJ CEP element still applies. A disclosure constitutes a voluntary self-disclosure only if it is made to the Fraud Division and “satisfies each element of the definition of voluntary self-disclosure in the CEP,” including that the misconduct was not previously known to DOJ and that disclosure was reasonably prompt.
  • Mandatory exclusion is not resolved. The HHS-OIG SDP benefits conferred by the Policy do not include resolution of mandatory exclusion under 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a).
  • Disclosures to other DOJ components. Under the CEP, good faith disclosure to one component where the matter is later brought to another appropriate component will also qualify, and the Policy confirms that good faith disclosures elsewhere in the Fraud Division or DOJ will qualify.
  • Company-focused. The Policy addresses corporate disclosures and does not purport to extend its coordinated benefits to individuals.
  • No enforceable rights. Like DOJ’s CEP, the Policy expressly does not create any right or benefit enforceable at law.

A Broader Push Toward Health Care Self-Disclosure

The Policy is part of a series of recent health care enforcement developments. It follows the Fraud Division’s October 1 corporate enforcement directive, which identified health care fraud as the first of the Fraud Division’s four enforcement priorities and which Lowenstein Sandler addressed in a prior alert. One week after the Policy was announced, on October 22 DOJ’s Civil Division and HHS announced a six-month Healthcare False Claims Act Self-Disclosure Pilot Program (Civil Pilot) for previously unknown civil False Claims Act violations, offering a coordinated civil resolution in exchange for repayment at a multiplier of 1.25 to 1.6 times the base loss amount. The Civil Pilot directs that potentially criminal health care conduct be disclosed to the Fraud Division under the Policy, though questions remain about how the criminal and civil pathways will coordinate in practice.

Key Takeaways

In light of the Policy, health care and life sciences companies should:

  • Go to the Fraud Division first for potentially criminal conduct. Companies seeking the benefits of both programs should make their initial disclosure of potentially criminal conduct to the Fraud Division, not HHS-OIG. A misdirected HHS-OIG-only disclosure may forfeit eligibility for a DOJ CEP declination.
  • Make the criminal-versus-civil call early. Because the correct point of entry now depends on whether conduct is potentially criminal, companies should involve experienced white-collar counsel at the outset of an internal investigation to assess criminal exposure before choosing a disclosure path.
  • Update escalation and disclosure protocols. Internal procedures for evaluating self-disclosure should be revised to reflect the Policy, the updated HHS-OIG SDP, and the Civil Pilot, including who makes the decision regarding disclosure and to which agency.
  • Do not lose sight of timing. The Fraud Division’s expanding data analytics and whistleblower incentives may narrow the window for a disclosure that qualifies as voluntary under the CEP.
  • Plan for exclusion and individual exposure separately. Mandatory exclusion and individual liability fall outside the Policy’s coordinated benefits and require independent analysis.

Lowenstein Sandler’s White Collar Defense group is closely monitoring DOJ’s and HHS-OIG’s health care fraud enforcement efforts. For guidance on evaluating self-disclosure, cooperation, or remediation under the Policy, the CEP, or the SDP, please contact us.