Last week, the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) National Fraud Enforcement Division (the Fraud Division) announced new corporate fraud enforcement priorities targeting health care, government, tax, and trade fraud and an “aggressive, all-tools approach” to investigating and prosecuting those priorities.

The new priorities and approach reveal how the Fraud Division will identify, investigate, and resolve corporate fraud matters, including through more centralized oversight of corporate investigations and drawing on technology and data analytics to open new investigations. Companies operating in the priority areas should review their compliance programs, internal reporting and escalation protocols, and approaches to voluntary self-disclosure in light of these developments.

The Directive

On October 1, 2026, Assistant Attorney General Colin McDonald issued a directive entitled “Corporate Enforcement in the Fight Against Fraud” (the Directive).

Under the Directive, the Fraud Division will prioritize prosecuting fraud involving (1) health care; (2) procurement, government contracts, and other government functions; (3) significant tax evasion; and (4) tariff evasion, importation of goods or services, and forced labor.

In making charging decisions and negotiating resolutions in corporate fraud matters, the Fraud Division will place “great weight” on the following factors:

  • Corporate management’s knowledge or involvement;
  • Efforts to conceal fraud or obstruct government oversight;
  • Conduct furthering the scheme that lasts three or more years;
  • Actions that threaten national safety or security;
  • Conduct that causes substantial financial hardship to a taxpayer-funded program or government function;
  • Conduct that affects multiple taxpayer-funded programs or government functions;
  • Conduct that affects three or more federal districts;
  • Conduct that results in financial harm to 25 or more victims or $25 million or more in loss;
  • Conduct that involves transferring U.S. dollars to support foreign adversaries; and
  • Conduct that involves immigration offenses.

According to the memo, prosecutors should consider these factors alongside DOJ’s longstanding “Filip Factors,” which have traditionally governed judgments about charging or resolving cases against corporations. See generally Justice Manual (JM) § 9-28.000 (Principles of Federal Prosecutions of Business Organizations); JM § 9-28.300 (setting forth the Filip Factors).

The Directive also centralizes oversight of corporate investigations. Under the Directive, prosecutors will work with the new Corporate Enforcement Section throughout all corporate investigations to “maximize efficiency, consistency, and results” and to “leverag[e] the unique toolbox of [the Fraud Division’s] corporate enforcement specialists.” Beginning one week after the Directive’s issuance, Fraud Division prosecutors will report ongoing corporate investigations to the Chief of the Corporate Enforcement Section and will promptly notify the Section of major developments and new investigations.

The Corporate Enforcement Section will have primary responsibility for evaluating a company’s compliance with any resolution. That will allow the Section to assess compliance with corporate resolutions consistently across the Fraud Division and make available resources to prosecute additional individual and corporate cases.

The Directive also reports that the Fraud Division is “proactively generating leads” and opening new investigations “at a rapid pace.” It is doing so through “an infusion of resources, state-of-the-art technology, and data analytics” through the National Fraud Detection Center. The Directive emphasizes the need to encourage and protect the disclosure of information by whistleblowers, including those who participated in the criminal conduct, and directed Fraud Division leadership to design and implement policies and programs to incentivize whistleblowers to report fraud. There are, of course, already many avenues and incentives for whistleblowers in a wide variety of cases, see, e.g., 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730(b)–(d); DOJ Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program Guidance, but we will await further DOJ guidance on whether the incentives the Directive alludes to will be materially different from those already in place.

DOJ’s Corporate Enforcement Policy

The announcement of these new corporate fraud enforcement priorities follows DOJ’s Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (CEP), released earlier this year and detailed in a prior alert. The CEP sets forth circumstances under which DOJ will decline to prosecute companies that voluntarily self-disclose misconduct, as well as “near miss” self-disclosures and aggravating factors that warrant resolutions.

The Directive specifies that Fraud Division prosecutors must continue to follow the CEP in pursuing the new priorities. The Fraud Division will “zealously prosecute” and “aggressively target” “corporate bad actors,” while “firmly guard[ing] against overbroad corporate enforcement.”  

Key Takeaways

The Directive signals that the Fraud Division intends to expand and centralize its corporate fraud enforcement efforts, while continuing to apply the CEP. Companies should note the following key takeaways:           

  • Increased scrutiny in priority areas. Companies in health care, government contracting, and procurement and businesses with significant tax or trade exposure should anticipate increased scrutiny and should conduct targeted risk assessments of these areas.
  • Aggravating factors will inform charging and resolution decisions. The Directive instructs prosecutors to assign “great weight” to factors such as management involvement, efforts to conceal or obstruct, conduct lasting three or more years, substantial financial hardship, impact across multiple programs or districts, losses of $25 million or more or harm to 25 or more victims, and others.
  • Consistent monitoring of corporate resolutions. Companies subject to existing or future resolutions with the Fraud Division should expect the Corporate Enforcement Section to evaluate their compliance and should confirm that remediation and reporting obligations are being met.
  • Evaluate voluntary self-disclosure early. The CEP remains in effect and provides a path to declination for companies that voluntarily self-disclose misconduct. As the Fraud Division expands its detection capabilities and whistleblower incentives, the opportunity for self-disclosure before the government learns of misconduct may narrow, underscoring the value of prompt internal investigations and early, counseled decisions about disclosure.

Lowenstein Sandler’s White Collar Defense group is closely monitoring DOJ’s enforcement priorities. For more information, please contact us.